a standing argument

The Mishna (Avot 5:17) says there are disagreements for the sake of heaven that will stand forever. When you hear that, it sounds like a stubborn argument on a matter so complex that neither can prove its correctness completely.

I suggest an alternative understanding, one which we can wrap our minds around. In the past I have suggested looking at a disagreement for the sake of heaven as the work of complimentary muscle groups like the biceps and triceps which work against each other but together achieve very fine motor coordination. Today I'd like to provide a very simple logical example of how this works based on a nice self contained piece of Gemara:

[Brachot 13a:] Can we read Shema Yisrael in a language other than Hebrew? There is a disagreement between Rabi and the Hachamim. Rabi says we learn from the word והיו they should be, they should be as they are, unaltered into another language. The Hachamim say we learn from the word שמע understand, we should say Shema Yisrael in any language we understand.

Simple enough, each one has their opinion, each supported from the text. However, the Gemara goes on to analyze some of the results of their opinions: If each were to be examined in a vacuum we would find some very interesting results: According to Rabi, we would be considered to fulfill the mitzwah of learning Torah by reading it in any language whatsoever. Otherwise, why would the Torah need a special case here to emphasize that Shema Yisrael must be read in hebrew? According to the Hachamim, we would only be fulfilling the mitzwah of Torah learning if we learned Torah in Hebrew, otherwise why would the Torah need a special case here to emphasize that Shema Yisrael can be read in any language?

But these opinions don't exist in a vacuum. We can't learn from here that Rabi says learning Torah can be done in any language, and conversely we can't learn that the Hachamim say learning Torah must be done in hebrew. Why not? Because Rabi can say the reason the Torah specifies here that Shema Yisrael must be read in hebrew is because one might have understood like the Hachamim understand and thought Shema Yisrael could be said in any language. And the Hachamim's answer? It isn't such a surprise. They could say that the reason the Torah specifically allows Shema Yisrael to be said in any language is because one might have thought like Rabi that the Torah seems to imply Shema Yisrael must be read in Hebrew.

You see? Neither of these opinions stands on its own. They require the existence of the counter-opinion for their own stance to be self-consistent and logical. The existence of the argument allows both points to have a degree of subtlety and specificity that would be entirely lacking if no argument existed.

Perhaps this is the depth and the strength of a machloket (a rational struggle) for the sake of heaven.

it isnt easy being blue

פתיל תכלת הוא בחינת מה שאמרו חז"ל: במקום שאתה מוצא ענותנותו, שם אתה מצא גדולתו - וכן להפך

I don't understand. I don't understand Korah's halachic question to Mosheh Rabbeinu. (as reported by Rashi)

We know that there are many halachoth that even though their ways seem peculiar, any other way does not fulfill the obligation. Why did anyone think that Korah's question was legitimate?

What was Korah's question? Here it is: If you have a whole garment, and adding a little blue (tcheleth) string permits the entire thing, why wouldn't an entirely blue garment be permitted outright? (without the addition of a little blue string.)

To me it definitely seems like asking: We don't wear tefillin on Shabbath because tefillin is a sign (ot) of HaShem, and Shabbath is a sign. If I wear tefillin on Shabbath, do I need to keep Shabbath?

Of course you need to keep Shabbath!!

What was Korah's real argument, why did it hold water, and why was it still wrong?

Perhaps I could understand it like this:

Tcheleth, the blue color of the tzitzith, as Chazal explain, is there to remind us of the Kisei HaKavod (the Throne of Glory) a testament to HaShem's greatness.

Basically it could be that Korah thought that if a small testament to HaShem is good enough, then certainly an entire garment colored to declare HaShem's greatness should be even better.

We can even understand how this is at the source of his claim to the Priesthood: He saw that Shmuel HaNavi would come from his line, and Shmuel HaNavi, Chazal explain, was 'equal' to Mosheh Rabbeinu and Aharon HaKohen combined. So, Korah could have thought: Aharon HaKohen is great, no doubt, but my line is even greater and if it is an honor to HaShem that Aharon HaKohen should represent Him, it would be an even greater glorification of HaShem's name if I were the Kohen Gadol.

The key lesson that Korah, according to my limited understanding, didn't pick up on, and perhaps it's only clear in hindsight, is that HaShem doesn't want ego and glory and pride, he wants us to be humble. Chazal teach us that in the same place that you find HaShem's humility that's where you find His greatness.

We see this lesson in practice: Har Sinai was chosen as the place to reveal HaShem and the Torah because it was a small and humble mountain. Mosheh Rabbeinu was chosen to receive the Torah because he was the most humble of all men.

Humility and Greatness must always go hand in hand. This is perhaps why the tzitzith only has a little string colored to remind us of the Throne of Glory, of HaShem's might and greatness. Because on the tzitzith, where we find HaShem's humility, in a single strand among many, we find a hint at HaShem's greatness.

peace for peace

[I'm sure there must be precedent for this in the literature of Chazal, but for me this is a hidush.]

We are taught that on our wedding day we are forgiven for all our sins.

My hidush is this: Every day that we restore our relationship to the status it had on our wedding day, we are forgiven for our sins.

People may say (and rightly so) no, your relationship has grown since your wedding, bringing it back to the relationship it was on the day of your wedding would be a step backwards. True. But the intention here is not that your relationship is the same as on your wedding day, but rather just as on your wedding day you were in a state of complete peace with one another, any day you restore total and complete shalom bayit, that day is like your wedding day.

To those who feel this isn't very difficult, I'm happy to hear that. I don't even know if it is difficult at all. My point is that the kavanah of the statement that we are foregiven for our sins on our wedding day is based in the shalom and unity of the new couple. Whenever we act to maintain that unity, HaShem certainly forgives us our past sins.

[this is why, in shacharit, creating shalom bayit is one of the things that "we eat the fruits in this world, and the keren, the lump sum, is waiting for us in the next world," we merit to be foregiven in this world, that is the fruit we eat, and in turn, because we are absolved in this world, we receive the next world as well.]

the measure of evil

When HaShem and Avraham finish their discussion about destroying Sdom, most people agree that Avraham gave in to HaShem and the angels went on to destroy Sdom.

I have another idea: The angels went on to judge Sdom and see if Avraham was correct. They were ready and willing to save Sdom. What happened? Sdom in its actions proved that it deserved to be destroyed.

This is clear from the plain reading of the text. The angels went to Lot and ate a meal by him. They didn't mention anything about the destruction until after the entire city had gathered on Lot's doorstep demanding he bring out the visitors.

Specifically the language of this passuk is curious:

טֶרֶם, יִשְׁכָּבוּ, וְאַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר אַנְשֵׁי סְדֹם נָסַבּוּ עַל-הַבַּיִת, מִנַּעַר וְעַד-זָקֵן: כָּל-הָעָם, מִקָּצֶה.

The last word מקצה is unusual. It means from the end. But there's a deeper meaning in this word. קצה has the gematria 195. If you take all the numbers mentioned in Avraham and HaShem's discussion, 50 + 45 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 = 195. The same number as the gematria of קצה. Meaning that every person that Avraham tried to argue might be considered a tzaddik in order that Sdom might be saved came out that night and proved his own evil nature. HaShem then, fulfilling His deal with Avraham, found Sdom wanting. At which point the angels intercede, save Lot, and destroy Sdom.

on binah vs. hochmah (vs. daath)

My friend YodaYid said [in a comment to my post about too much focusing on labels and self-definition] many varied things and I will try to address each one of them in an untangled manner. First of all, I'm going to avoid entirely the definitions and meanings of english words, both because I don't like to sound like an intellectual (I know, who knew?) and because whether or not an english word means something has limited bearing on how best we, as Jews(hey look! he labelled something), should focus our energies. [Also, because anything I'd have to say on the matter would probably be wrong.. stupid mongrel hard-to-understand languages. ;) ]

1. Firstly, the Rebbe Nachman quote, "ability to tell one thing from another" is by my best guess (without knowing which story it was from? Master of Prayer?) an issue of translation. It almost certainly is a poor translation of l'havin davar m'toch davar (more closely translated: "To understand one thing from another.") which is related to the idea of 'width' of understanding. In any case it leads me to an explanation of Binah, which I will get to in a minute.
2. Secondly, he touches on the concept of Machloket or a disagreement as to the proper determination of specific torah laws (halachot).
   
3. Thirdly and lastly, he brought up the issue of different modes and transmission of Torah, itself related to machlokot. (Well, he might not have noticed he brought it up but he did.)
   

I will try to clarify these points from a top down approach:

The Torah has two major perspectives, and many many others that are out of my scope. The perspectives break down into the written Torah and the oral Torah.

We learn that the written Torah has its roots in Hochmah (loosely: Wisdom)
and that the oral Torah has its roots in Binah. (loosely: Understanding) Now the written Torah is more static and less fluid than the spoken Torah, just as the written word is more permanent and less ephemeral than the spoken one. In essence, the oral Torah involves the application of the written Torah in a particular place at a particular moment. There is a lot more to the oral Torah, namely the codification of what the written Torah means and the study of the jurisdiction of the various laws.

Here we arrive at a particular paradox because Hochmah is founded in the nature of being simultaneously all-inclusive, whereas Binah's nature is to cut away and narrow things down to their essence. Yet, it would seem that the oral Torah makes the written Torah more, not less, universal. This is a misunderstanding. In practice, the oral Torah takes the one-ness of the written Torah and whittles it down into the ruling appropriate to a particular instance. The oral Torah takes the written Torah out of its universal context and places it into a specific subjective context. The oral Torah metabolizes the unpalatable written Torah, making it digestible. This is their nature. [An important side note in this regard is that Kabbalah is essentially written Torah, not oral Torah as one might think. Don't take my word for it, the R'David Pinto's Pachad David was the first place I heard this idea. I asked my Rav and He explained it more.] If we stop to think about it for a second, the Kabbalah itself has none of the practical applicability of the oral Torah.]

Now lets apply these understandings a little. Machloket, a disagreement of the applicability of a particular Torah law is obviously oral and not written Torah, because it deals with applicability, with subjective hypothetical situations. This is why throughout the oral Torah, the Mishna and the Talmud as well as all the later poskim, there are arguments where one truth is uncovered and all other opinions refuted. In the written Torah, Midrash and Zohar, all opinions are offered without any care for contradictions as all opinions are allowed to stand at once, however much at odds they may seem to be. Perhaps we can understand this fundamental difference in the nature of Machloket itself. There are two kinds of Machloket, those for the sake of heaven and those for other selfish interests. The Machloket of Hillel and Shamai, mentioned in Yoda Yid's comment, is, we are told, for the sake of heaven; whereas we are given other examples of less self-less machlokot. (That of Korach is the foremost example.) We are told that Machloket for the sake of heaven (out of the objective desire to know and fulfill God's will) will stand forever, unlike subject/selfish machlokot that will fall. In essence, perhaps because all the 'Machlokot' of the Kabbalah are by definition objective, this may be why they stand without refutation. Whereas the nature of Machloket in the oral Torah is to apply to a specific subjective situation, and so, all but the correct or appropriate opinion must be pared away.

Now, let's understand all this and how it applies to YodaYid's question:

One issue I have similar to chaim g.'s first comment: the Talmud seemingly has no problem categorizing Jews - Tzedukim, Samaritans, Hellenists, not to mention "orthodox" groups following Hillel vs. Shammai etc. As soon as you start enumerating the differences between your beliefs and those of others, you are already moving in the direction of classification. ...In other words, I think Judaism places a very strong emphasis on finding and creating structure. It's the wrong structures we have to worry about.

The Talmud, as I explained above is specifically involved in a Binah mode of thinking, a paring down of many potential applications of Law to determine which law applies in a specific setting. The Talmud itself is a codification and generalization of such a style of thinking in order that any student could reconstruct this mode of Binah.

Classification serves a purpose in the determination of one's actions day to day. But the oral Torah, the Torah of Binah, is totally informed by and inspired by the written Torah, the Torah of the unity of creation with God, Chochmah.

This was my goal in my original post. Not to deny the importance of classification and application of ideas appropriate to a particular occasion, but to reconnect that power of classification to the source of everything, to one-ness with HaShem. Of course structure is not only important, it is vital. In my thoughts on Autism post I stated more specifically that there are two major modes of functioning, ratz (Running) and shav (Returning). The post to which you responded, is involved entirely in ratz, throwing aside all structure in order to unite with God's oneness. (Though if you re-read you will see that I did delineate between good and bad structure as you suggested I should) It is in the shav mode that it is vital to return into the structure in order to affect (ie. carry out God's will in) the created world. Unsurprisingly ratz corresponds strongly with Hochmah, and shav with Binah.